Belief and Skepticism

I have read the first edition, so I don't know what might have changed between editions. Shermer is the director of the Skeptic Society so it is not difficult to imagine his stance regarding belief and religion. Still, Shermer is obviously well-educated and makes a good case for his agnostic position.
However, I would have liked for Shermer to engage Catholicism more and better. He was a born-again Christian who lost his faith. This has resulted in what I see as a certain hostility, if not, patronizing attitude towards born-again and Evangelical Christians. He does seem to like the Pope (John Paul II) however.
Shermer is quite selective in his consideration of scientists who profess religious beliefs. He does not once mention individuals like Ian Barbour, Stanley Jaki, Arthur Peacocke and most especially John Polkinghorne.
He trots out the usual suspects like Hawking, Dawkins, and Gould to help make his case. Overall, I do thnk that he makes a good argument for the difference between science and faith. This is a reasoned account that does take belief seriously.
Like fellow skeptics/atheists, Shermer overstates the hegemony of science. He claims that science has proved all phenomena by natural law, but what do we make of the fact that Quantum Physics has supplanted Newtonian Physics? Models and paradigms change, so science is not absolute nor infallible.
Curious that Shermer refuses to even consider "near-death experiences" as there is a substantial body of literature on these phenomena.
I don't think Shermer's arguments regarding design and how we see design in nature as being particularly strong. The same goes for his attempt to explain away mystical experiences as "temporal lobe" seizures and aberrant brain physiology.
Likewise, the whole "multiverse" idea runs headstrong into Occam's Razor, which seems to be a standard embraced by Shermer in most contexts.
I don't understand why he critiques so many other scientists, but does not offer the slightest critique of someone like Hawking. Plenty of critiques are out there.
His chapter on Ghost Dances and the Messiah Myth is unconvincing. This is the comparative religion, cultural anthropology argument: If many cultures have a messiah myth, than all messiah myths are just myths. The other argument that Shermer neglects to make is: perhaps these various myths point to a "truth" that is beyond science?
His chapter on Gould and glorious contingency seems to me like Gould's attempt to bring the anthropic principle back into play. It reminds me of process theology, what I've read of it, in that God continues to be involved in the process of the universe.
A good book, but not as good as Shermer thinks it is.